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Abstract
We develop a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers to investigate the
impact of information production on optimal policy design. A sender produces
information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects, and
the government implements corrective subsidies and taxes to maximize social
welfare. Subsidies to the sender’s preferred action incentivize her to produce less
information, while taxes motivating her to produce more. Such an informational
effect impacts the receiver’s decision and social welfare. We show that the
optimal corrective subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian
level. Most notably, the optimal policy is no government intervention when the
spillover is positive and small.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that many economic activities have external effects. By replacing its
old fleet with more fuel-efficient aircrafts, an airline can reduce its carbon emissions.
By loosening environmental regulations on coal mining, a government motivates
the coal industry to generate more air pollution. Although the external effects of
these actions are certain, the airline and the government may be uncertain about
how these actions affect their payoffs. In particular, more fuel-efficient aircrafts are
typically more costly to purchase and operate. Job-saving deregulation for the coal
mining industry may hurt workers in the renewable energy industry. Therefore,
to persuade the airline to buy newly designed aircrafts, manufacturers usually
provide various information, such as reports about fuel efficiency and maintenance
costs. To persuade the government to loosen environmental regulations, lobbyists
often produce research on the economic benefits of job creation in the coal industry.
Motivated by these examples, we develop a model of Bayesian persuasion with
spillovers.
We adopt the Bayesian persuasion framework developed by Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) to study the interaction between government intervention and
information production. In the model, a sender produces information to persuade a
receiver to take an action. The impact of the action on the receiver is uncertain, but
the action certainly generates externalities on society. Since the receiver neglects the
externalities of the action, his decision may lead to inefficient outcomes. Therefore, a
policymaker can impose a subsidy or tax on the receiver to maximize social welfare.
A common solution to externalities is Pigouvian subsidies and taxes.1 Accord-
ing to Pigou (1920), the government should subsidize those who produce positive
externalities by an amount equivalent to the external benefits and tax those who
produce negative externalities in an amount equal to the external costs. Such a policy
is indeed optimal in an environment where the receiver has exogenous information
about his payoffs. In this paper, we consider an environment in which the sender
endogenously produces information for the receiver and investigate the optimal
1Other solutions to externalities include Coasian bargaining (Coase 1960), permit markets for
pollution rights (Arrow 1970), the folk theorem of repeated interactions (Fudenberg and Maskin
1986), and incentive mechanisms such as compensation mechanism (Varian 1994).
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value of corrective subsidies and taxes in such environment.
We make three important contributions to the literature. First, we find an infor-
mational effect of corrective subsidies and taxes. We show that corrective subsidies
and taxes not only affect the decision-making of the receiver but also influence the
sender’s information production strategy. Specifically, subsidies reduce the cost of
taking the sender’s preferred action, making the receiver less hesitant to act. There-
fore, the sender responds to greater subsidies by producing less information. Taxes,
however, have the opposite informational effect as subsidies because taxes increase
the cost of taking the sender’s preferred action and make the receiver more skeptical.
To our knowledge, we are the first to find such an informational effect of corrective
subsidies and taxes.
Second, we show that the optimal value of corrective subsidies and taxes may be
different from the Pigouvian level due to the informational effect illustrated above.
In our model, corrective subsidies and taxes not only improve social welfare by
internalizing externalities but also affect social welfare through the informational
effect. Firstly, subsidies make it easier for the sender to persuade the receiver to
take her preferred action and thus improve the sender’s welfare. Secondly, subsidies
incentivize the sender to produce less information, leading to less informed decisions
and lower welfare for the receiver. Since taxes have the opposite informational
effect as subsidies, taxes reduce the sender’s welfare and increase the receiver’s
welfare. Then we show that the optimal subsidies and taxes may be different from
the Pigouvian level. Most notably, when the sender’s preferred action has small
positive external effects, social welfare can be maximized without any subsidies.
Our result is in contrast to the conventional wisdom that government interventions
are necessary to solve the externalities problem and highlights the importance of
considering endogenous information production for optimal policy design.
Finally, we apply our model to study fiscal federalism and show that decentralized
decision-making can be optimal in the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers. We
can think of the sender as a lobbying group and the receiver as a local government.
The lobbying group wants to persuade the local government to implement a project
with interjurisdictional spillovers. Similar to the novel result above, we show that de-
centralized decision-making is optimal when the positive interjurisdictional spillover
is small. The intuition is that with small positive externalities, the cost of less in-
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formed decision-making dominates the benefit of centralization, so decentralization
is optimal. Although previous studies have shown that decentralized policymaking
can be optimal in the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers, the mechanisms
driving their results are very different from ours.2 Therefore, our analysis provides a
novel theory as to why decentralized decision making may be optimal in the presence
of interjurisdictional spillovers.
2 Model
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. There are two strate-
gic players: Sender and Receiver. Sender wants to persuade Receiver to take an
action, which affects the payoffs of Sender, Receiver and a non-strategic player called
Bystander.
Receiver’s action, denoted by a, is chosen from action space A = {0,1}. Receiver’s
payoff uR(a,θ) depends on his own action a ∈ A and an unknown state of the world
θ ∈Θ = {0,1}:
uR(a,θ) = a(θ − c). (1)
As shown in (1), Receiver receives a payoff of 0 from action a = 0 regardless of the
state of the world. When taking action a = 1, Receiver incurs a cost of c and receives
a benefit that equals to the state of the world θ. We assume 0 < c < 1. Thus, Receiver
prefers action a = 1 to a = 0 when θ = 1 and the opposite when θ = 0.
Sender and Bystander both have state-independent preferences. When Receiver
takes action a = 0, both receive a payoff of 0. But when Receiver takes action a = 1,
Sender and Bystander receive a payoff of γ1 and γ2 respectively. We assume that
γ1 > 0 and thus Sender prefers action a = 1 to action 0 regardless of the state of the
2The studies on fiscal federalism are interested in the optimal allocation of decision rights within
the government (e.g. Oates 1972, Besley and Coate 2003, Ogawa and Wildasin 2009, Eichner and
Runkel 2012, Fell and Kaffine 2014). Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) and Eichner and Runkel (2012)
consider a model where jurisdictions are linked by a competitive market of capital, which produces
emissions when it is used for production. In their model, a jurisdiction’s choice of capital taxes is
distorted by its incentives for tax competition and its inattention of interjurisdictional spillover effects.
They show that both distortions could neutralize each other, making decentralized taxation optimal.
Fell and Kaffine (2014) show that the results in Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) depend on two important
assumptions and they may not hold in a more general model.
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world. The value of γ2, however, can be either positive or negative, depending on the
nature of action a = 1.
We can think of Sender as Boeing, Receiver as an airline, and Bystander as the
general public. Boeing prefers the airline to buy its newly designed aircrafts. The
general public also prefers new planes because they produce fewer carbon emissions
than the current fleet. Although the general public is certain about the emission
reduction, the airline is uncertain whether the benefits of the new aircrafts outweigh
their costs. Therefore, both γ1 and γ2 are positive. Similarly, we can consider Sender
as the coal mining industry in West Virginia, Receiver as the state government and
Bystander as the neighboring states. The coal mining industry prefers the state
government to weaken environmental regulations. Although weaker environmental
regulations may benefit the state economy, the state government is uncertain whether
the benefits dominate the environmental costs. Pollutions caused by the weaker
environmental regulations, however, certainly hurt the neighboring states. In this
case, γ1 is positive but γ2 is negative.
The state of the world θ ∈Θ = {0,1} is ex-ante unknown to everyone. The common
prior belief is that θ = 1 with probability µ0 ∈ (0,1) and θ = 0 with probability 1−µ0.
Following the Bayesian persuasion literature, we assume that Sender can influence
Receiver’s action by producing information about the state of the world θ. Formally,
Sender designs a costless signal, denoted by pi, which is composed of two probability
distributions pi(·|θ = 1) and pi(·|θ = 0) over a finite realization space S . Signal pi
then generates a public realization s ∈ S . Based on signal pi and its realization s ∈ S ,
Receiver updates his belief about the state of the world according to the Bayes’ rule:
µ ≡ Pr(θ = 1|s) =
µ0pi(s|θ = 1)
µ0pi(s|θ = 1) + (1−µ0)pi(s|θ = 0)
. (2)
where µ represents the posterior belief of the state being θ = 1. Receiver then chooses
the action that gives him the highest payoff based on µ.
Bayesian persuasion models typically assume that Sender can control the signal
design but not the signal realization. That is, Sender can control how evidence is
produced (e.g. pharmaceutical companies control how clinical trials are conducted,
aircraft manufacturers decide how fuel consumption is calculated), but she cannot
forge evidence. Therefore, Sender is unable to control precisely what posterior
beliefs will be generated, but she can control the distribution of posterior beliefs by
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designing signal pi.
We use τ to denote the distribution of posterior beliefs induced by signal pi.
Distribution τ is Bayes-plausible if its expected value equals the prior belief µ0, i.e.
E[τ] = µ0. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that to derive Sender preferred
signal, it is sufficient to derive the Bayes-plausible distribution of posterior beliefs
preferred by Sender. Therefore, Sender’s signal design problem is to choose τ to
maximize her expected payoff subject to E[τ] = µ. In our model, maximizing Sender’s
expected payoff is equivalent to maximizing the probability of Receiver taking action
a = 1.
We define social welfare as the sum of the payoffs of Sender, Receiver and By-
stander:
W (a,θ) = a(θ − c +γ1 +γ2). (3)
By comparing the social welfare function and Receiver’s utility function, we can see
that Receiver’s preferences are not perfectly aligned with the society. This is because
Receiver neglects the spillover effects. We define γ ≡ γ1 + γ2 and refer to γ as the
aggregate spillover effects of action a = 1.
Lastly, the timing of the game is as follows. First, the government decides the
amount of subsidy or tax to maximize social welfare. Second, Sender observes the
subsidy or tax and design signal pi. Third, Receiver observes the signal and its
realization, updates his belief about the state of the world according to the Bayes’
rule, and then chooses his action.
3 Analysis
In this section, we first show that the Pigouvian subsidies and taxes are optimal in a
benchmark case when there is no information production by Sender. We then show
how optimal subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level when
information is endogenously produced by Sender through Bayesian persuasion.
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3.1 Benchmark: No Persuasion
If Sender does not produce information about the state of the world θ, Receiver
makes decisions based on his prior belief µ0. In this case, his optimal action is:
a(µ0) =



1 if µ0 ≥ c
0 otherwise
(4)
Meanwhile, the ex ante efficient action is
aEE(µ0) =



1 if µ0 ≥ c −γ
0 otherwise
(5)
Apparently, Pigouvian subsidies and taxes are necessary for efficient outcomes when
there is no information production by Sender. When γ > 0 and c − γ < µ0 < c, the
government can induce efficient outcomes by providing subsidy t = γ (financed by a
tax on Bystander) for action a = 1. When γ < 0 and c < µ0 < c − γ , the government
can induce efficient outcomes by taxing action a = 1 in the amount of T = |γ |.
3.2 Persuasion with Positive Spillovers
Nowwe consider the case when the aggregate spillover is positive, i.e. γ > 0. We focus
on the prior beliefs for which it is ex ante necessary for government intervention:
c −γ < µ0 < c (A1)
As shown in Section 3.1, if there is no information production, and (A1) holds, it is
ex ante optimal to provide Pigouvian subsidies for action a = 1. We are interested in
whether the Pigouvian subsidies are still optimal for this range of prior beliefs when
Sender produces information through Bayesian persuasion.
Suppose the government provides Receiver a subsidy of t ≥ 0 for taking action
a = 1, which is financed by a tax on Bystander.3 We first pin down Sender’s optimal
signal given any subsidy and then derive the value of subsidy that maximizes social
welfare.
3The qualitative results continue to hold if we assume that the subsidy is financed through a
lump-sum tax on all the players in the model.
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3.2.1 Optimal signal
Given posterior belief µ and subsidy t, Receiver prefers action a = 1 when
µ− c + t ≥ 0⇔ µ ≥ c − t, (6)
where c − t refers to Receiver’s threshold of doubt.
Under Assumption (A1), c − µ0 is positive. When t ≥ c − µ0, or c − t ≤ µ0, the
subsidy is sufficient to motivate Receiver to take action a = 1 because his threshold
of doubt is below the prior belief. Thus, Sender does not need to persuade Receiver.
When t < c −µ0, or c − t > µ0, the subsidy is insufficient, and Receiver’s threshold
of doubt is above the prior belief. That is, Receiver is ex ante against action a = 1, and
Sender must attempt to persuade. Therefore, Sender’s optimal strategy is to design a
signal that generates the following Bayes-plausible distribution of posterior beliefs:
τ∗ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c−t
c − t with probability
µ0
c−t
(7)
Figure 1 shows that, by generating posterior beliefs 0 and c − t while keeping the
mean at µ0, Sender can achieve expected payoff that equals the red dotted line, which
is strictly above her payoff from no persuasion (i.e. zero). The difference between the
red dotted line and the horizontal axis represents Sender’s gain from persuasion. As
shown by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the red dotted line (the concave closure of
Sender’s expected payoff) represents largest expected payoff that Sender can achieve
given prior belief µ0. Therefore, the distribution of posterior beliefs in (7) is optimal
for Sender. Such a distribution is also feasible because it is Bayes-plausible (i.e. its
mean equals the prior belief µ0).
Sender can generate the distribution of posterior beliefs in (7) in many ways, one
of which is committing to recommend action a = 1 with the following probabilities:
Pr(recommend |θ = 0) =
µ0(1− c + t)
(c − t)(1−µ0)
, (8)
and
Pr(recommend |θ = 1) = 1. (9)
If Sender does not recommend action a = 1, Receiver is certain that θ = 0 and prefers
action a = 0. If Sender recommends action a = 1, Receiver’s posterior belief becomes
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µuS (µ)
0
γ1
c − t 1
Figure 1: Sender’s payoff as a function of the posterior belief (solid line) and its concave
closure (dotted line).
c − t, which is his threshold of doubt. Although Receiver is still uncertain about the
value of θ after receiving Sender’s recommendation, the updated information is just
enough to persuade him to take action a = 1.
Sender’s signal becomes less informative if Sender raises the probability of recom-
mending action a = 1 when the state of the world is θ = 0. Therefore, the larger the
probability in equation (8), the less informative Sender’s signal. It is straightforward
to show that the probability in equation (8) is increasing in subsidy t. Therefore,
Sender’s optimal signal becomes less informative in response to greater subsidies.
The intuition is that an increase in the subsidy reduces Receiver’s threshold of doubt,
which encourages Receiver to take action a = 1.
To see why Sender’s optimal signal becomes less informative when subsidies
increase, we can also look at the distribution of posterior beliefs generated by Sender’s
optimal signal. As t increases, Sender’s optimal distribution of posterior beliefs in
(7) becomes less “spread out” and thus corresponds to a less informative signal.
Proposition 1 When the aggregate spillover effect γ is positive and the prior belief µ0
satisfies (A1), the informativeness of Sender’s optimal signal is decreasing in subsidy t if
t < c −µ0.
Proposition 1 highlights an informational effect of corrective subsidies. In an
environment where information is endogenously produced by Sender, corrective
9
subsidies not only affect Receiver’s decision-making but also influence Sender’s
information production. If the subsidy itself is insufficient to motivate Receiver
to take action a = 1, Sender designs a partially informative signal in equilibrium:
she produces just enough information about the state of the world to maximize the
probability that Receiver taking action a = 1. In this case, greater subsidies encourage
Receiver to act and reduce the difficulty to persuade Receiver. Therefore, Sender
responds to greater subsidies by producing less information.
3.2.2 Optimal subsidies
Given Sender’s optimal signal, we can derive the expected social welfare E[W ]. When
t ≥ c − µ0, the subsidy is sufficiently large. Thus, Sender produces no information,
and Receiver always chooses action a = 1 in equilibrium. The equilibrium payoffs
of Sender, Receiver and Bystander are γ1, µ0 − c + t and γ2 − t respectively.
4 Social
welfare is the sum of everyone’s payoff and thus equals
µ0 − c +γ . (10)
When t < c − µ0, Sender designs a signal that generates the following Bayes-
plausible distribution of posterior beliefs
τ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c−t
c − t with probability
µ0
c−t
(11)
If the posterior belief equals 0, Receiver does not take action a = 1 in equilibrium,
giving everyone zero payoff. But if the posterior belief equals c − t, Receiver takes
action a = 1 in equilibrium. In this case, Sender’s equilibrium payoff is γ1, Receiver’s
equilibrium payoff is (c− t)− c+ t = 0 and Bystander’s equilibrium payoff γ2− t. Since
posterior belief c− t appears with probability µ0/(c− t), the expected social welfare is
E[W ] =
µ0
c − t
×γ1
︸    ︷︷    ︸
Sender’s payoff
+
µ0
c − t
× 0
︸   ︷︷   ︸
Receiver’s payoff
+
µ0
c − t
× (γ2 − t)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
Bystander’s payoff
=
µ0(γ − t)
c − t
(12)
Equation (12) shows various welfare effects of the subsidy on each agent. First,
Sender’s payoff µ0γ1/(c − t) is increasing in subsidy t. Second, Receiver’s payoff is
4Bystander’s payoff is γ2 − t because we assume that the subsidy to Receiver is financed by a tax on
Bystander.
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zero. Although corrective subsidies raise Receiver’s payoff from taking action a = 1,
they also incentivize Sender to produce less information, leading to less informed
decisions by Receiver. That is, as subsidy rises, Sender becomes less likely to tell
the truth when the state of the world θ = 0, which hurts Receiver. These two effects
cancel each other, so Receiver’s expected payoff remains at zero regardless of the
value of the subsidy. Third, Bystander’s payoff is µ0(γ2− t)/(c− t), which is increasing
in t if γ2 > c, and decreasing in t otherwise. This is because the net effect of subsidies
depends on the size of the spillover effect. On one hand, greater subsidies make
Receiver more likely to take action a = 1, benefiting Bystander through positive
spillovers. On the other hand, greater subsidies lay more tax burden on Bystander.
The following lemma summarizes the expected social welfare function.
Lemma 1 Given Sender’s optimal signal, the expected social welfare is:
E[W |t] =



µ0 − c +γ when t ≥ c −µ0
µ0
c−t (γ − t) when t < c −µ0
t
E[W ]
0 c −µ0 t
E[W ]
0 c −µ0
Figure 2: The expected social welfare as a function of subsidy t. The left figure shows
the case when γ < c. The right figure shows the case when γ > c.
Figure 2 shows the expected social welfare as a function of subsidy t. Firstly,
social welfare remains constant for any t ≥ c −µ0. This is because when subsidies are
sufficiently large, Receiver always take Sender’s preferred action in equilibrium and
social welfare is fixed at µ0 − c +γ .
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Secondly, subsidies that are less than c −µ0 not only affect social welfare through
the traditional channels of internalizing spillovers but also influence social welfare
through the informational channels illustrated above. For relatively small exter-
nalities (when 0 < γ < c), the welfare costs associated with subsidies dominate the
benefits, and the expected social welfare is decreasing in t. In this case, the expected
social welfare is maximized when t = 0, implying that no government intervention
is optimal. For relatively large externalities (when γ ≥ c), the benefits of subsidies
dominate the welfare costs, so the expected social welfare is increasing in t. In this
case, social welfare is maximized by any t ≥ c −µ0, including the Pigouvian subsidy
t = γ .
Proposition 2 When the aggregate spillover effect γ is positive and the prior belief µ0
satisfies (A1), social welfare is maximized without subsidies if the spillover effect is small
(i.e. γ < c). For greater spillover effects (i.e. γ ≥ c), social welfare is maximized by
subsidies that are no less than c −µ0, including the Pigouvian subsidy t = γ .
Although the Pigouvian subsidy is optimal in the benchmark case, it is no longer
optimal when information is endogenously produced. After considering endoge-
nous information production, we show that corrective subsidies not only internalize
spillovers by changing Receiver’s action but also affect Sender’s information produc-
tion strategy. Interestingly, social welfare can be maximized without subsidies when
positive spillovers are small. This result contrasts the conventional wisdom that we
need government interventions to internalize externalities. Therefore, our analysis
has important policy implications: when designing policies to correct externalities,
policymakers should not only understand the magnitude of spillovers but also be
aware of the potential policy impact on endogenous information production.
3.3 Negative Spillovers
In this section, we consider the case when the aggregate spillover of action a = 1 is
negative, i.e. γ < 0. Since γ ≡ γ1 +γ2 and γ1 is always positive, a negative γ implies
that γ2 is negative and |γ2| > γ1.
5 This is the case when Bystander’s loss from action
5When γ2 is negative and |γ2| < γ1, the aggregate spillover effect γ is still positive and the analysis
is similar to Section 3.2.
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a = 1 outweighs Sender’s gain from the action. Again, we focus on the range of prior
beliefs for which it is ex ante necessary to have government interventions:
c < µ0 < c −γ (A2)
As Section 3.1 shows, when (A2) is satisfied, Pigouvian taxes are necessary for ex ante
efficiency. We are interested if such taxes continue to be optimal when information
is endogenously produced by Sender.
Suppose the government imposes taxes of T on action a = 1 and the tax revenue
is then transferred to Bystander. We are interested in the value of T that maximizes
social welfare. The derivation of Sender’s optimal signal is similar to the analysis in
Section 3.2 and is thus omitted. The following lemma summarizes Sender’s optimal
signal.
Lemma 2 When the government imposes a tax of T on action a = 1, Sender’s optimal
signal is as follows:
• when T ≥ 1− c, Sender is indifferent between all signals.
• when T < µ0 − c, Sender chooses a fully uninformative signal.
• when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c, Sender chooses a partially informative signal that generates
the following distribution of posterior beliefs:
τ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c+T
c +T with probability
µ0
c+T
(13)
Lemma 2 shows that if the tax is neither too small to be negligible nor too
large to fully deter action a = 1 (i.e. when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1 − c), Sender designs a
partially informative signal in equilibrium. In this case, an increase in T leads
to a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of posterior beliefs generated by
Sender’s optimal signal. A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of posterior
beliefs corresponds to a more informative signal. Therefore, greater taxes on Sender’s
preferred action induces Sender to produce more information. The next proposition
summarizes such an informational benefit associated with greater taxes.
Proposition 3 When the aggregate spillover effect γ is negative and the prior belief µ0
satisfies (A2) , the informativeness of Sender’s optimal signal is increasing in tax T if
µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c.
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Taxes on action a = 1 increases Receiver’s threshold of doubt, making Receiver
more hesitant to take the action. If the tax is above the Pigouvian level but insufficient
to fully deter the action, it forces Sender to produce more information about the
action. Such impact contrasts the informational effect of subsidies since subsidies
make Receiver less hesitant to take Sender-preferred action and incentivize Sender
to produce less information. Given Sender’s optimal signal, we can calculate the
expected social welfare and derive the optimal tax.
Lemma 3 Given Sender’s optimal signal, the expected social welfare is
E[W |T ] =



µ0 − c +γ when T < µ0 − c
µ0
c+T (γ +T ) when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c
0 when T ≥ 1− c
(14)
Taxes greater than 1− c can deter Receiver from taking action a = 1. Taxes smaller
than µ0 − c, however, can never deter Receiver from taking action a = 1. In these
cases, social welfare is independent of tax T . When µ0− c ≤ T < 1− c, corrective taxes
not only internalizes the negative spillovers but also influence social welfare through
two additional channels. First, as Proposition 3 shows, greater taxes can increase
informativeness of the signal, leading to more informed decision-making and higher
payoffs for Receiver. Second, greater taxes reduce Sender’s payoff by lowering the
probability that Receiver takes Sender’s preferred action. it is straightforward to
show that the welfare gain of Receiver and Bystander dominates Sender’s welfare
loss. Therefore, corrective taxes have a net positive effect on social welfare when
µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c.
Figure 3 shows that social welfare is increasing in tax T when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c.
When the spillovers are small (i.e. |γ | < 1− c), corrective taxes can lead to positive
social welfare and the optimal tax is T = 1 − c. When the spillovers are relatively
large (i.e. |γ | ≥ 1− c), the greatest feasible social welfare is zero and any tax no less
than 1− c is optimal.
Proposition 4 When the aggregate spillover effect γ is negative and the prior belief µ0
satisfies (A2), the optimal tax T equals 1− c if the spillover effect is small (i.e. |γ | < 1− c).
When the spillover effect takes greater values (i.e. when |γ | ≥ 1− c), the optimal tax is any
T no less than 1− c.
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TE[W ]
0
µ0 − c
1− c T
E[W ]
0
µ0 − c 1− c
Figure 3: The expected social welfare as a function of tax T . The left figure shows
the case when |γ | < 1− c and the right figure shows the case when |γ | ≥ 1− c.
For negative spillovers, corrective taxes are still necessary for efficient outcomes
when we consider endogenous information production. However, the optimal value
of corrective taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level due to the informational
effect of corrective taxes. When the externalities are small (i.e. when |γ | < 1− c), the
optimal value of the tax is 1− c, which is greater than the Pigouvian level. When the
externalities are large (i.e. when |γ | ≥ 1− c), any taxes greater than 1− c are optimal,
including the Pigouvian tax T = |γ |.
4 Application: Interjurisdictional Spillovers
In this section, we apply our model to compare centralized and decentralized
decision-making when local decision making leads to interjurisdictional spillovers.
The literature on fiscal federalism has analyzed this problem from various aspects
(e.g. Oates 1972, Besley and Coate 2003, Ogawa and Wildasin 2009, Eichner and
Runkel 2012, Fell and Kaffine 2014). We provide a novel perspective to investigate
how the allocation of decision rights within the government affects special interest
group’s incentives to produce information.6
6Although it is well documented that special interest group often produce information to influence
policy decisions (Austen-Smith and Wright 1992, Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006, Dahm and Porteiro
2008, Cotton 2012, Cotton and Dellis 2016), Li (2020) is the only paper that takes into informational
lobbying when comparing centralized and decentralized decision-making. His paper, however,
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We can think of Sender as a lobbying group, Receiver as a local government, and
Bystander as other jurisdictions in the nation. Action a = 1 represents a local project
that produces externalities to other jurisdictions. The lobbying group always prefers
the local government to implement the project. The local government, however, is
uncertain how the project affects the jurisdiction. To persuade the local government
to implement the project, the lobbying group produces information about the project.
We want to find the socially optimal allocation of authority: should we allow the
local government to decide whether to implement the project or should we have a
central government to make the decision?
A common assumption in the fiscal federalism literature is that the central gov-
ernment cares about social welfare while the local government only cares about the
welfare in its jurisdiction. Therefore, under centralization, the central government
internalizes spillovers and chooses action a = 1 when:
µ− c +γ ≥ 0⇔ µ ≥ c −γ . (15)
Under decentralization, however, the local government chooses action a = 1 when:
µ− c ≥ 0⇔ µ ≥ c. (16)
Equations (15) and (16) show that only the central government considers the spillover
effect. The central government acts as someone who receives a Pigouvian subsidy
t = γ when γ > 0 and pays a Pigouvian tax T = |γ | when γ < 0. The local government,
however, acts as someone who receives no subsidy and pays no tax. Therefore, to
compare social welfare under centralization and decentralization, we just need to
understand whether Pigouvian subsidies and taxes improve social welfare.
Figure 2 shows that for positive spillovers, Pigouvian subsidies t = γ lead to
higher social welfare than t = 0 when γ < c but the opposite when γ ≥ c. This im-
plies that decentralization is optimal for small positive interjurisdictional spillovers.
The reasoning is similar to the cost-benefit analysis highlighted in Section 3.2. The
central government considers positive spillovers and thus is more willing to imple-
ment the project than the local government. The lobbying group anticipates the
does not consider interjurisdictional spillovers. Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini (2008) and
Lima, Moreira and Verdier (2017) consider monetary lobbying when comparing centralized and
decentralized decision-making, but they do not consider information production by interest groups.
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raised willingness and produces less information about the project to the central
government. Therefore, when the spillovers are small, the welfare loss associated
with such an informational effect dominates the benefits of centralization, making
decentralization optimal.
Figure 3 shows that for negative spillovers, a tax T = |γ | always lead to greater
social welfare than T = 0.7 Therefore, centralization is always optimal for negative
interjurisdictional spillovers. The next proposition summarizes the findings above.
Proposition 5 For positive interjurisdictional spillovers and prior beliefs specified in
(A1), decentralization is optimal when γ < c and centralization is optimal when γ ≥ c.
For negative interjurisdictional spillovers and prior beliefs specified in (A2), centralization
is always optimal.
Our analysis highlights a novel informational effect of centralized decision-
making: when interjurisdictional spillovers are positive and small, centralized
decision-making leads to less information produced by the lobbying group and
less informed decision-making by the government. More importantly, the welfare
loss associated with less informed decision-making dominates the benefits of central-
ization. Therefore, our analysis provides a novel theory to explain why decentralized
decision-making could be optimal with the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we incorporate endogenous information production to study optimal
policy design against externalities. We find a novel informational channel through
which corrective subsidies and taxes affect social welfare. We find three important
results. First, we show that subsidies to the sender’s preferred action incentivize
her to produce less information, while taxes motivating her to produce more. Sec-
ond, we also show that the optimal value of subsidies and taxes may be different
from the Pigouvian level. Most notably, social welfare is maximized without any
subsidies when the spillover is positive and small. Third, we apply the model to
investigate the allocation of authorization and find that decentralization is optimal
when interjurisdictional spillover is positive and small.
7Note that |γ | is larger than µ0 − c because of assumption A2.
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Our analysis highlights the importance of considering endogenous information
production to study interventions to correct externalities. When policymakers design
corrective subsidies and taxes, they should not only understand the magnitude of
spillovers but also be aware of the potential policy impact on endogenous information
production.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 When the government imposes a tax of T on action a = 1, Sender’s optimal
signal is as follows:
• when T ≥ 1− c, Sender is indifferent between all signals.
• when T < µ0 − c, Sender chooses a fully uninformative signal.
• when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c, Sender chooses a partially informative signal that generates
the following distribution of posterior beliefs:
τ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c+T
c +T with probability
µ0
c+T
(13)
Given posterior belief µ and tax T , Receiver takes action a = 1 when
µ− c −T ≥ 0⇔ µ ≥ c +T , (17)
where c +T is Receiver’s threshold of doubt.
When T ≥ 1− c, Receiver’s threshold of doubt is larger than one, meaning that
Receiver never takes action a = 1 in equilibrium. In this case, Sender is indifferent
between all the information production strategies.
When 0 < T < 1 − c, Receiver’s threshold of doubt is between zero and one. In
this case, Receiver’s action depends on whether the prior belief is greater than the
threshold of doubt, while Sender decides whether to produce information accordingly.
Specifically, when T < µ0 − c, the tax is relatively small, and the prior belief is still
above Receiver’s threshold of doubt (i.e. µ0 > c +T ). In this case, Receiver is ex ante
in favor of action a = 1, and thus Sender can ensure that Receiver chooses action
a = 1 by producing no information. When µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c, the tax is sufficiently
large, and Receiver’s prior belief is below the threshold of doubt (i.e. µ0 ≤ c +T ). The
receiver is ex ante against the action a = 1 because of the tax. In this case, Sender has
an incentive to produce information to persuade Receiver. Similar to the situation
under positive spillover, Sender has a uniquely optimal signal that generates the
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following distribution of posterior beliefs
τ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c+T
c +T with probability
µ0
c+T
Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 Given Sender’s optimal signal, the expected social welfare is
E[W |T ] =



µ0 − c +γ when T < µ0 − c
µ0
c+T (γ +T ) when µ0 − c ≤ T < 1− c
0 when T ≥ 1− c
(14)
When T < µ0 − c, Sender produces no information and Receiver chooses action
a = 1 in equilibrium. The sender’s equilibrium payoff is γ1, Receiver’s equilibrium
payoff is µ0 − c −T and Bystander’s equilibrium payoff γ2 +T . Social welfare is thus
µ0 − c +γ .
When µ0 − c ≤ T < 1 − c, Sender designs a signal that generates the following
Bayes-plausible distribution of posterior beliefs
τ =



0 with probability 1−
µ0
c+T
c +T with probability
µ0
c+T
When the posterior belief equals 0, Receiver does not take action a = 1 in equilibrium,
giving everyone zero payoff. In this case, social welfare is zero. When the posterior
belief equals c +T , Receiver takes action a = 1 in equilibrium. The sender’s equilib-
rium payoff is γ1, Receiver’s equilibrium payoff is (c +T )− c −T = 0 and Bystander’s
equilibrium payoff γ2 +T . In this case, social welfare equals to γ +T . Therefore, the
expected social welfare given Sender’s optimal signal is
(1−
µ0
c +T
)× 0+
µ0
c +T
(γ +T ) =
µ0
c +T
(γ +T ).
Lastly, when T ≥ 1− c, Receiver never takes action a = 1, and everyone gets zero
payoff.
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